Comparative study of distance metrics for t-closeness by Vallabhadas, Dilip Kumar
Comparative Study of Distance Metrics
for
t-closeness
Dilip Kumar Vallabhadas
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela-769 008, Odisha, India
Comparative Study of Distance Metrics
for
t-closeness
Thesis submitted to the department of
Computer Science and Engineering
of
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
in partial fulllment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Technology
by
Dilip Kumar Vallabhadas
[ Roll No. 211CS2063 ]
under the guidance of
Prof. Korra Sathya Babu
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela-769 008, Odisha, India
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Rourkela-769 008, India. www.nitrkl.ac.in
Mr. Korra Sathya Babu
Assistant Professor
Certicate
This is to certify that the work in the thesis entitled Comparative Study of Distance
Metrics for t-closeness by Dilip Kumar Vallabhadas is a record of an original work
carried out by him under my supervision and guidance in partial fulllment of
the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Technology in Computer
Science and Engineering. Neither this thesis nor any part of it has been submitted
for any degree or academic award elsewhere.
Korra Sathya Babu
Acknowledgment
First of all, I would like to express my deep sense of respect and gratitude
towards my supervisor Prof. Korra Sathya Babu, who has been the guiding
force behind this work. I want to thank him for introducing me to the eld of
Data Privacy and giving me the opportunity to work under him. His undivided
faith in this topic and ability to bring out the best of analytical and practical skills
in people has been invaluable in tough periods. Without his invaluable advice and
assistance it would not have been possible for me to complete this thesis. I am
greatly indebted to him for his constant encouragement and invaluable advice in
every aspect of my academic life. I consider it my good fortune to have got an
opportunity to work with such a wonderful person.
I wish to thank all faculty members and secretarial sta of the CSE Department
for their sympathetic cooperation.
I am really thankful to my all friends. My sincere thanks to everyone who has
provided me with kind words, a welcome ear, new ideas, useful criticism, and their
invaluable time, I am truly indebted.
My thanks and apologies to those whom I have inadvertently missed out.
Finally, Above all I praise God for helping me in completing my work.
Dilip Kumar Vallabhadas
Abstract
In our present technical world we all have to submit our personal information
to various organisations driven by mutual benets. The collected data has to be
published. There was a need for exchange of the published data between dierent
parties. Given data in its original form contains sensitive information of the person.
If the given data is published directly sensitive information is revealed to others
which violates the privacy of individual directly. In order to publish the data
without violating one's personal privacy we use a technique called t-closeness.
In this method the metric used was Earth Mover's Distance(EMD). But this
metric does not satises probability scaling property which makes it not to reect
the dierence between the probabilities. This make EMD to produce inaccurate
results which may increase the anonymization. In order to have a metrics that
satises all the distance metric properties including probability scaling property
we make a study on dierent metrics like Squared Root Jensen-Shannon,Pearson
and Divergence. We compare these metric by taking dierent parameters like
Discenibility Metrics,propensity score and precision.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In our present technical world we all have to expose our personal information
at various government and private organization like hospitals, voter enrolment
and so on. For example, licensed hospitals in California are required to
submit specic data on every patient discharged from their facility [1]. In
June 2004, the Information Technology Advisory Committee released a report
entitled Revolutionizing Health Care Through Information Technology. One of
its key points was to establish a nationwide system of electronic medical records
that encourages sharing of medical knowledge through computer assisted clinical
decision support. Data publishing is equally distributed in other domains.
For example, Netix, a popular online movie rental service, recently published
a data set containing movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers, in a drive to improve
the accuracy of movie recommendations based on personal preferences [2]; AOL
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published a release of query logs but quickly removed it due to the re-identication
of a searcher [3].
Given data in its original form contains sensitive information of
individual,publishing this directly violates the one's individual privacy [4]. The
data should be published in a way that one cannot get any useful information
from the released data. In order to provide particular privacy a task has been
introduced which is known as Privacy Preserving and Data Publishing(PPDP).
The main objective of this method is to preserve one's privacy while publishing
the data [5]. Lot of methods have been proposed on PPDP but having some of the
attacks on them. Here we are focusing on t -closeness which is helpful in protecting
against the attribut disclosure attack. It uses Earth Mover Distance(EMD) for
calculating the distance. But EMD doesn't satisfy probability scaling property of
a distance metrics.
1.2 Privacy Preserving Data Publishing
A task is to be produced in-order to publish the data without violating the
privacy of individual. This technique of publishing data is known as Privacy
Preserving Data Publishing(PPDP) [6]. In the past few years , several researchers
have proposed dierent methods for PPDP. These proposed methods have their
advantages and disadvantages , we need a method that balance both utility and
privacy
To publish data [4,7{9] introduced a method caleed k -anonymity.k -anonymity
2
1.2. PRIVACY PRESERVING DATA PUBLISHING Introduction
says that an equivalence class on quasi-identier should contain at least k records.k
anonymity can protect over identity disclosure but it fails to protect against
attribute disclosure.Two attacks have been identied on k -anonymity they are
homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack. In order to overcome
this another method has been proposed known as l -diversity.It states that an
equivalence class should have atleast l well represented values. A table satises
l -diversity if and only if each equivalence class should satisfy l -diversity [10].
l -diversity was also not able to protect against attribute disclosure. Two attacks
have been identied on l -diversity they are similarity attack and skewness attack
[11],k -anonymity and l -diversity are not sucient to protect against attribute
disclosure [12] so a new method to protect against attribute disclosure has been
introduced which is known as t-closeness
t-closeness states that the distance between distribution of attributes in each
equivalence class and whole table should not be more than t [11].t-closeness uses
Earth Mover distance(EMD). In EMD we have a drawback that it does not satisfy
probability scaling. However t-closeness protect against attribute disclosure but it
does not satisfy identity disclosure. The distance metric used in t-closeness does
not works properly so we need a distance metric that gives accurate results. Here
we are discussing dierent metrics that can be used on t-closeness for calculating
the distance detween two probabilities and also the properties required for a
distance metrics. We compare these metrics with the given Metric i.e EMD
3
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1.3 Problem Statement
The main problem is to calculate the distance between two probability
distributions. For this measure of distance we use Earth Mover Distance(EMD).
When we are using EMD for calculating the distance in t -closeness. Due to the
lack of probability scaling in EMD the reecting dierence is not considered for
some random values. This makes the metrics to give inaccurate results. So, there
is a need to have a measure which satisfy all the properties of a distance metrics.
So that we can have a good metrics for calculation of distance in t-closeness which
considers all the value and gives more accurate results.
1.4 Motivation
The data that we are giving to dierent organizations contain sensitive
information. In order to protect the privacy of one's personal data we need
a method that does not reveals any sensitive information but can share the
information between dierent organizations. So we use dierent methods that
are used to publish the data without revealing sensitive information of a person.
We use k-anonymity and l-diversity but they were able to handle only identity
disclosure. To protect against attribute disclosure we use t-closeness
4
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1.5 Organisation of Thesis
The following chapters gives the outline and organization of the thesis with an
emphasis on the contributions.
Chapter 1: Introduction In this chapter we are going to discuss brief
introduction and the fundamental concept of Privacy Preserving and Data
Publishing(PPDP).It also gives the information why we are using dierent distance
metrics for calculating t-closeness and also the problem of the existing metrics. It
also gives the basic idea of our metrics
Chapter 2: Literature Review In this chapter, we are going to discuss the
basic denitions that are required for PPDP. Attacks that are performed on the
released data. We are going to have a description of dierent methods and the
attacks that are existing on these methods.
Chapter 3: Distance Metrics In this chapter, we are going to discuss about
dierent properties required for a distance metrics. Eath Mover Distance in detail
and the proof for the failure of EMD
Chapter 4: Distance Metrics used for study In this chapter we are going
to discuss dierent metrics which can also be used for t-closeness.Comparison of
those metrics with EMD.
Chapter 5: Results Here we are going to give graph for comparing of these
metrics on dierent costs like DMCost,Propensity Score and Precision. And also
5
1.5. ORGANISATION OF THESIS Introduction
we are going to have tabular form of metrics satisfying dierent properties to be
a good distance metrics
Chapter 6: Conclusion This chapter gives the use of the method and
limitations of the proposed schemes.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter we are going to discuss about how the data is to be stored and
various methods of publishing the data without violating the personal privacy
of a person. The attacks that are possible on each of the method and also the
advantages and disadvantages of the existing methods.
2.1 Basic Denitions
Generally the data has to be published are stored in the form of tables.Each
table contains several records which are divided into attributes. Based on the
functionality of the attributes these tables are divided into four type of attributes.
They are explained using the following table.
7
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SSN NAME AGE JOB SEX SALARY DISEASE
321 A 28 Engineer Male 4K Cancer
432 B 32 Engineer Female 3K Heart disease
543 C 26 Lawyer Male 3K Flu
234 D 45 Dancer Male 4K Cancer
456 E 32 Lawyer Female 3K Flu
426 F 42 Engineer Female 3K Gastritis
453 G 32 Lawyer Female 3K Stomach disease
Table 2.1: Example
The attributes are described as follows [6]
• Explicit Identier : These are the attributes that are used to identify the
record owner directly. In the above table SSN and Name are Explicit
Identiers.
• Quasi Identier : These are the attributes that are used to potentially
identify records owner. Age,Job and Sex are quasi Identiers in the above
table.
• Sensitive Attributes : These are the attributes that contains the
person-specic information.Salary and Disease are the sensitive attributes
in the above table.
• Non-Sensitive Attributes : All the attributes that does not fall into these
three categories are considered as Non-Sensitive attributes.
8
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When releasing the micro data dierent disclosures [13] have been identied
they are
• Identity Disclosure : Disclosure occurs when a data subject is identied from
a released le
• Attribute Disclosure : Attribute disclosure occur when condential
information is revealed exactly or when it can be closely estimated.
• Inferential Disclosure : The released data make it possible to determine the
value of some characteristic of an individual more accurately than otherwise
would have been possible
2.2 k-Anonymity
Denition:
Let RT(A1; A2; :::; An) be a table and QIRT be the quasi-identier associated
with it. RT is said to satisfy k -anonymity if and only if each sequence of values
in RT[QIRT ] appears with at least k occurrences in RT[QIRT ]. [7]
The basic idea of k -anonymity is easy and simple to understand. If a person
knows quasi-identier value of an individual he cannot nds an individual
record from a table satisfying k -anonymity with condence greater than 1-k
corresponding to that individual. k -anonymity was able to protect against
identity disclosure but it cannot protect against attribute disclosure. [6, 7, 10, 11]
has recognize attacks on k -anonymity
9
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Example of k -anonymous table with
• k=2,QID= Race, Birth, Gender, Zip
• Sensitive attribute=Problem
Race Birth Gender Zip Problem
Black 1965 m 02141 short breath
Black 1965 m 02141 chest pain
Black 1964 f 02138 obesity
Black 1964 f 02138 chest pain
White 1964 m 02138 chest pain
White 1964 m 02138 obesity
White 1964 m 02138 short breath
Table 2.2: 2-Anonymous [7]
2.2.1 Attacks on k-Anonymity
Several authors [4, 7{9, 11] has discussed attacks on k -anonymity. There are two
types of attacks k -anonymity. They are
• Homogeneity Attack
• Background Knowledge Attack
10
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Homogeneity Attack:
Lets have Alice and Bob are two neighbours [10].One day that bob feels sick and
admitted in a hospital. Seeing that she fells that Bob has some disease. She get's
4-anonymous table that was released by the hospital.
Alice being his neighbour she knows the age of bob and also the zip code.
By having these data she gets an idea that bob record is in 9,10,11 or 12 record.
Since each record have disease condition as cancer she was able to know that bob
is suering from cancer
S No Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 130** < 30 * Heart Disease
2 130** < 30 * Heart Disease
3 130** < 30 * Viral Infection
4 130** < 30 * Viral Infection
5 1485* 40 * Cancer
6 1485* 40 * Heart Disease
7 1485* 40 * Viral Infection
8 1485* 40 * Viral Infection
9 130** 3* * Cancer
10 130** 3* * Cancer
11 130** 3* * Cancer
12 130** 3* * Cancer
Table 2.3: 3-Anonymous [7]
11
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Background Knowledge Attack:
Alice contain a friend Umeko who is been admitted in the same hospital as bob
admitted [10]. As Umeko is her friend she know her age and also the address
where she lives. From this information Alice know that Umeko record should in
be in 1,2,3 or 4 record in Table 2.3.
From the records she was not sure that Umeko has heart disease or cancer.
However she knows that Japanese were extremely low incidence of having heart
disease.So that she concludes with more probability that Umeko is suering from
viral infection
2.3 l-Diversity
Denition:
An equivalence class is said to have l -diversity if there are at least l "well
represented" values for the sensitive attribute. A table is said to have l -diversity
if every equivalence class of the table has l -diversity [10]
l -diversity works one step ahead of k -anonymity in preventing attribute
disclosure.But l-diversity is more dicult to achieve and also it is not able
to provide sucient protection for privacy. l -diversity also does not provide
protection against attribute disclosure. In [11] attacks have been discussed on
l -diversity. In Table 2.4 even though Alice knows bob's age and zip code she was
not able to infer from the 3-diverse table
12
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S No Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 1305* 40 * Heart Disease
4 1305* 40 * Viral Infection
9 1305* 40 * Cancer
10 1305* 40 * Cancer
5 1485* > 40 * Cancer
6 1485* > 40 * Heart Disease
7 1485* > 40 * Viral Infection
8 1485* > 40 * Viral Infection
2 1306* 40 * Heart Disease
3 1306* 40 * Viral Infection
11 1306* 40 * Cancer
12 1306* 40 * Cancer
Table 2.4: 3-Diverse [10]
When it comes to Umeko Alice thinks that Japanese are most low in heart
disease. She was not sure that Umeko has cancer or viral infection.
2.3.1 Attacks on l-Diversity
In [10,11] authors have discussed the attacks on l -diversity. They are
• Skewness Attack
• Similarity Attack
13
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Skewness Attack
In a given l -diverse table when the overall distribution is been skewed even though
the table satises l -diversity it was not able to prevent against attribute disclosure.
For example consider a table with equal number of positive and negative record
[11]. Even though the table was able to satisfy l -diversity this contains a serious
privacy threat. Everyone in the table has a probability of 50% of being positive
or negative which is as compared with 1%.
Similarity Attack
In a given l -diverse table, even though sensitive attributes in a given equivalence
class are distinct but they are semantically similar so the adversary can get the
required information. Let us consider a table with sensitive attribute as disease.
14
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S No Zip Code Age Salary Disease
1 47677 29 3K gastric ulcer
2 47602 22 4K gastritis
3 47678 27 5K stomach Cancer
4 47905 43 6K gastritis
5 47909 52 11K u
6 47906 47 8K bronchitis
7 47605 30 7K bronchitis
8 47673 36 9K pneumonia
9 47607 32 10K stomach cancer
Table 2.5: Original Table [10]
In the given 3-diverse Table 2.6 one know that the salary of bob is in the
range of [3K,4K] which is in the rst 3 records. By having these information one
conclude that bob's record is in rst equivalence class. By this he conclude that
bob has stomach related disease.
2.4 t-closeness
Denition:
An equivalence class is said to have t-closeness if the distance between the
distribution of a sensitive attribute in this class and the distribution of the
attribute in the whole table is no more than a threshold t. A table is said to
15
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S No Zip Code Age Salary Disease
1 476* 2* 3K gastric ulcer
2 476** 2* 4K gastritis
3 476** 2* 5K stomach Cancer
4 4790* 40 6K gastritis
5 4790* 40 11K u
6 4790* 40 8K bronchitis
7 476** 3* 7K bronchitis
8 476** 3* 9K pneumonia
9 476** 3* 10K stomach cancer
Table 2.6: 3-Diverse [10]
have t-closeness if all equivalence classes have t-closeness [11]
At rst an observer has a belief B0 which is prior belief about sensitive
information of an individual. After he has given generalized table then his belief
is inuenced by Q which changes to B1. After release of the anonymous table
by using the quasi-identier he can nd the equivalence class P then his belief
changes to B2. We try to limit the gain of B1 to B2 which there by limits the
distance between P and Q.
Here we are going to consider two probability distributions p(x) and q(x). Here
we try to limit the distance between p(x) and q(x).It is given as
D[p(x); q(x)] < t (2.1)
16
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In this given work we use Earth Mover Distance(EMD) to calculate the distance
between two probability distributions. But EMD does not work well due to the
lack of probability scaling property.
17
Chapter 3
Distance Metrics
The problem here is to measure the distance between p(x) and q(x) where p(x)
and q(x) are two probability distribution . p(x) is the distribution of the rst
equivalence class with x value and q(x) is distribution of whole table having x
values. Here we have to limit the distance between p(x) and q(x) which should
be less than the threshold t. In order to have a good privacy we have to maintain
low t value. If t value is low the more privacy we can get. A good metric is
that it does not reveal any information. So that a 0-closed table does not reveal
any kind of information. In this chapter we rst discuss the properties that are
required to be a good distance metric then we go are going to discuss about the
EMD distance metric which is used to calculate t value then we are going to show
how EMD failed to provide good privacy
18
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3.1 Properties of Distance Metrics
Let us consider a function F:XxR is said to be a distance function if and only if it
satises the following properties [14]
• Non Negativity:
The adversary have non negative information gain after the release of the
table. It can be shown mathematically as D[P;Q]  0.
• Identity of discernibles:
The adversary has no information gain until his belief change. It is shown
mathematically as D[P,Q]=0 if and only if P=Q.
• Triangular Inequality:
For any given three distributions P,Q and R it is dened as D[P;Q] 
D[Q;R] +D[R;P ]
• Probability Scaling:
The belief change from probability P is more signicant than that of Q when
t is small. D[P,Q] should consider reecting the dierence
• Zero Probability Denability:
When there are zero probable values in both P and Q. The distance between
P and Q should be well dened i.e D[P,Q]
19
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3.2 EMD Distance Metric
We have a metric for ground distance is dened for any pair of values. In
t-closeness we have two distributions for which we have to nd the distance. We
need that distance should be dependent on the ground distance which makes
us to go for Earth Mover's Distance(EMD) [11, 15] which is Monge-Kantovich
transportation distance [16]. In t-closeness we are going to nd the distance
between P and Q where P is the distribution of values in equivalence class and Q
is the distribution of values in the whole table. The main disadvantage of EMD is
that it does not satisfy probability scaling property of a distance metric and also
the computation required for EMD is more. In general we are going to use data
set which is not normalized but EMD requires normalized data set. In the next
section we are going to discuss about how EMD fails probability scaling property.
3.3 Failure of EMD
Let us consider two distributions (0.01,0.99) and (0.11,0.89) the EMD measure
between these two distributions is 0.1. Consider another two distributions (0.4,0.6)
and (0.5,0.5) the EMD measure between these two distributions is also 0.1. One
may argue that belief change in rst two distributions is much more signicant
than in second. In rst the probability of taking the rst value is from 0.1 to 0.11
which is a 1000 percent [11]. But in second case it is only 25 percent even though
the EMD measure gives 0.1 for both the cases. This happens because of the
lack of probability scaling, EMD does not reects each value some values are been
20
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neglected. Which produces inaccurate distance In result the tuples are been placed
in improper equivalence class. Which results in increasing the anonymization. So
there is a need for a good metric which satises the above all properties and should
produce a close t value.
21
Chapter 4
Distance Metrics used for Study
In privacy preserving and data publishing th main challenge is to have a good
trade of between utility and privacy. From the existing model we are able to
handle attribute disclosure which means attribute disclosure can be handled by
satisfying t-closeness. However privacy and utility cannot get compromised they
have to be so that while publishing the data we use to have a utility along with
privacy. In [11,17] t-closeness is been satised which provides a protection against
attribute disclosure. In [11] we know that authors have taken EMD distance
measure for calculating the distance between the two distributions P and Q. P is
the distribution of the equivalence class and Q is the distribution of whole table.
In order to satisfy t-closeness the distance between P and Q does not exceed the
threshold value t. EMD does not satises probability scaling property. So there is
a need for metric which satises all the properties of a distance metric [18]. Here
we are going to discuss various metrics [19, 20] that t-closeness. How they are
giving the distance between p and q.
22
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Let us consider two multinomial populations p(x) and q(x), each consisting
of N classes with respective probabilities p(x=1),p(x=2),.....,p(x=N) and
q(x=1),q(x=2),......,q(x=N). Since both p(x) and q(x) are probability distribution
we have
PN
x=1 p(x) =
PN
x=1 q(x) = 1
4.1 Squared Root of JSD
The measure for squared Root of Jensen-Shannon Divergence [21] is given as
Dsjsd =
p
JSD (4.1)
Where JSD is Jensen-Shannon divergence. This equation gives the metric
which is been derived from jensen-shannon divergence [22] which satises all the
properties of the distance metrics.
The coecient JSD is given as
JSD(p; q) =
1
2
[
NX
x=1
p(x)log
2p(x)
p(x) + q(x)
+
NX
x=1
q(x)log
2q(x)
p(x) + q(x)
] (4.2)
Where JSD is the symmetric version of Kullback-Leibler Divergence.
KL(p; q) =
NX
x=1
p(x)
q(x)
q(x) (4.3)
Squared Root Jensen-Shannon Divergence(SJSD) satises all the properites of
a distance metrics [21]. The SJSD distance between two probability distributions
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(0.01,0.99) and (0.11,0.89) is 0.16032. The distance between another two
distributions (0.4,0.6) and (0.5,0.5) is 0.0707. By this we can say that the change
of rst two probability distributions is much more signicant when compared to
the second two distributions. So SJSD satises the probability scaling property.
4.2 Pearson 2
Let us consider two probability distribution p(x) and q(x) where p(x) is
probability of equivalence class and q(x) is the distribution of whole class. The
pearson [19] measure for this distributions is given as
Dp =
mX
i=1
(pi   qi)2
qi
(4.4)
Pearson also satises the metric properties we are required.The Pearson [23]
distance between two probability distributions (0.01,0.99) and (0.11,0.89) is 0.102.
The distance between another two distributions (0.4,0.6) and (0.5,0.5) is 0.0404.
Pearson also shows the reection of the values so it also satises the probability
scaling property.
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4.3 Divergence
Let us consider two probability distributions p and q over a variable x. Then the
equation for the divergence [19,20] measure is given as
Dd =
mX
i=1
(pi   qi)2
(pi + qi)2
(4.5)
The above equation also satises all the properties of a distance metrics.The
Divergence distance [24] between two probability distributions (0.01,0.99) and
(0.11,0.89) is 0.6727. The distance between another two distributions (0.4,0.6)
and (0.5,0.5) is 0.0206. This measure also satises probability scaling but the
measure produce a large value. In order to have a good privacy we need a value
which is much less i.e around 0.1.
4.4 Comparision of Metrics for distributions
In this section we are going to discuss how these metrics are going to reect for
a given distributions. Here we are giving how other metrics satises probability
scaling property.
Let us consider two cases of probability distribution. In case1 we are going
to take p(x)=(0.01,0.99) and q(x)=(0.11,0.89). The comparison table is given as
follows
EMD - Earth Mover's Distance
SJSD - Squared Root of Jensen-Shannon
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Methods Case 1 Case 2
EMD 0.1 0.1
SJSD 0.16032 0.0707
Pearson 0.102 0.0404
Divergence 0.6727 0.0206
Table 4.1: Comparison of Metrics
Case 1:p=(0.1,0.99) q=(0.11,0.89)
Case 2:p=(0.4, 0.6) q=(0.5, 0.5)
F rom the Table 4.1 we can clearly say that EMD does not satises probability
scaling property and the other metrics which we used were able to satisfy all the
properties So, we can use this metrics for calculating the distance between two
distributions in t-closeness.
4.5 Analysis of Distances
Our experiment using R environment on the adult set gives the clear view of all
the metrics. The gure 4.1 gives the dierence in distance produced by various
metrics.When we compute the distance between two distribution p(x) and q(x)
on the adult set we got the distance for EMD as 0.266 for SJSD the distance is
0.199255 for divergence the distance is 0.1822 and for pearson it is 0.4096. The
dierence of these metrics were plotted.
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Figure 4.1: Analysis of distance with closeness
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Results
The main goal of this study is to have a good privacy metric that balance both
privacy and utility. Here we are looking for a metric which works good than that
of EMD.
5.1 Computational Environment and Dataset
Here we are working on Adult dataset which is a repository of US census. From
the dataset we are taking 8 attributes. The attributes which we are considering
are Age which is numeric, Work class which is categorical, Education which is
categorical, Marital status which is categorical, race which is categorical,gender is
categorical, Occupation is sensitive attributes
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S.No Attributes Type
1 Age Numeric
2 Work Class Categorical
3 Zip Code Numeric
4 Education Categorical
5 Marital Status Categorical
6 Race Categorical
7 Gender Categorical
8 Occupation Sensitive
Table 5.1: Attributes taken from Dataset
5.2 Evaluation Parameters
In this we are going to evaluate by using three parameters namely Propensity
Score(PS), Discernibility Metric Cost(DM cost) and Precision.By using these three
parameters we are going know how these metrics are been working. Here we are
using occupation as sensitive attribute
5.2.1 Discernibility Metric
The rst parameter we use is one that attempts to capture in a straight forward
way the desire to maintain discernibility between tuples as much as is allowed by
a given setting of t. DM Cost assigns a penalty to each tuple based on how many
tuples in the transformed dataset are indistinguishable from it. If an unsuppressed
tuple falls into an induced equivalence class of size j, then that tuple is assigned
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a penalty of j . If a tuple is suppressed, then it is assigned a penalty of jDj, the
size of the input dataset. This penalty reects the fact that a suppressed tuple
cannot be distinguished from any other tuple in the dataset [25]. The metric can
be mathematically stated as follows:
CDM(g; k) =
X
8Es:t:jEjk
jEj2 +
X
8Es:t:jEj<k
jDjjEj (5.1)
In this expression, the sets E refer to the equivalence classes of tuples in D induced
by the anonymization g . The rst sum computes penalties for each non-suppressed
tuple, the second for suppressed tuples.
Figure 5.1: DM Cost for various Metrics
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5.2.2 Propensity Score
The propensity score , in the literature, is dened as the probability of assigning a
treatment given a covariate, x. for any propensity score,the treatment assignment
and covariates are conditionally independent. Thus, its evident that two large
groups with same distributions of propensity scores also have similar distributions
of covariates. This helps us in measuring the utility .In calculating propensity
score [26] rst we have have to merge both original data and masked data to a
variable by giving one value for masked and zero value for original data.Then we
compute the probability of each record to be in masked data. Then we compute
the probability of having in original and masked. When both the distributions are
equal then utility will be high.
The similarity of the propensity scores for the masked and original observations
can be assessed in numerous ways. A simple summary is to compute
Up =
1
N
NX
i=1
[Pi   C]2 (5.2)
where N is is total number of records in the merged data and p is the estimated
propensity score for unit i and c equals the proportion of units with masked data
in the merged data set.In many cases, the original and masked data sets would
have the same size N0, in which case, N = 2N0 and c = 1/2. When the original
and masked data have the same distribution, the propensity scores for all units
should approximately equal c, so that Up is near zero. At the other extreme, if
p is nearly one for units i from the masked data and nearly 0 for units from the
original data, then the two data sets are completely distinguishable and Up 1/4.
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Method Propensity Score
EMD 0.21
SJSD 0.23
Divergence 0.25
Pearson 0.25
Table 5.2: Comparison of Propensity Score
5.2.3 Precision
The precision of a generalization scheme is the average height of generalization
(measured over all cells). The precision is 1 if the is no generalization that is if we
use same values as given and is 0 if all values are generalized. [27]
Figure 5.2: Comparision of precision
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Conclusion
In order to have a good privacy metric we need to balance both utility and privacy
which are inverse terms. Existing metrics does not provide a good privacy due to
the lack of probability scaling it does not reect all the values. In order to have
a good metrics that balance both privacy and utility we use dierent metrics.
By satisfying t-closeness we are able to handle attribute disclosure. Here we
have given dierent metric which can be used in calculating the distance between
probability distributions in t-closeness. A method should be produced which can
handle both identity disclosure and attribute disclosure.In order to satisfy both
identity disclosure and attribute disclosure we have to combine both k -anonymity
and t-closeness but that will become more complex.
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